Value of syndromic surveillance within the Armed Forces for early warning during a dengue fever outbreak in French Guiana in 2006 by Meynard, Jean-Baptiste et al.
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Medical Informatics and 
Decision Making
Open Access Research article
Value of syndromic surveillance within the Armed Forces for early 
warning during a dengue fever outbreak in French Guiana in 2006
Jean-Baptiste Meynard*1, Hervé Chaudet2, Gaetan Texier3, Vanessa Ardillon4, 
Françoise Ravachol5, Xavier Deparis6, Henry Jefferson7, Philippe Dussart1, 
Jacques Morvan1 and Jean-Paul Boutin3
Address: 1Institut Pasteur de la Guyane, Cayenne 97306, French Guiana, 2Université de la Méditerranée, Marseille 13385, France, 3Institut de 
Médecine Tropicale du Service de santé des armées, Marseille 13998, France, 4Cellule Inter Régionale d'Epidémiologie Antilles-Guyane, 97306, 
French Guiana, 5Direction de la Santé et du Développement Social de la Guyane, 97306, French Guiana, 6Ecole du Val-de-Grâce, Paris 75230, 
France and 7Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool L3 5QA, UK
Email: Jean-Baptiste Meynard* - jbmeynard@pasteur-cayenne.fr; Hervé Chaudet - lhcp@acm.org; Gaetan Texier - gaetex1@gmail.com; 
Vanessa Ardillon - vanessa.ardillon@sante.gouv.fr; Françoise Ravachol - Francoise.RAVACHOL@sante.gouv.fr; 
Xavier Deparis - xavier.deparis@wanadoo.fr; Henry Jefferson - henryjefferson@gmail.com; Philippe Dussart - pdussart@pasteur-cayenne.fr; 
Jacques Morvan - jmorvan973@yahoo.fr; Jean-Paul Boutin - jeanpaul.boutin@free.fr
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: A dengue fever outbreak occured in French Guiana in 2006. The objectives were
to study the value of a syndromic surveillance system set up within the armed forces, compared to
the traditional clinical surveillance system during this outbreak, to highlight issues involved in
comparing military and civilian surveillance systems and to discuss the interest of syndromic
surveillance for public health response.
Methods: Military syndromic surveillance allows the surveillance of suspected dengue fever cases
among the 3,000 armed forces personnel. Within the same population, clinical surveillance uses
several definition criteria for dengue fever cases, depending on the epidemiological situation.
Civilian laboratory surveillance allows the surveillance of biologically confirmed cases, within the
200,000 inhabitants.
Results: It was shown that syndromic surveillance detected the dengue fever outbreak several
weeks before clinical surveillance, allowing quick and effective enhancement of vector control
within the armed forces. Syndromic surveillance was also found to have detected the outbreak
before civilian laboratory surveillance.
Conclusion: Military syndromic surveillance allowed an early warning for this outbreak to be
issued, enabling a quicker public health response by the armed forces. Civilian surveillance system
has since introduced syndromic surveillance as part of its surveillance strategy. This should enable
quicker public health responses in the future.
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Background
One of the main objectives of health surveillance systems
is to provide early warning of disease outbreaks, which
allows for acceleration and optimization of a public
health response. In the current context of international
bioterrorism threats, early warning has become increas-
ingly important, and many countries, including the
Armed Forces based in French Guiana, have incorporated
warning systems into their civilian and military surveil-
lance systems [1,2].
French Guiana is a French overseas department in South
America where tropical diseases responsible for outbreaks
exist, such as dengue fever. Dengue fever is a viral disease,
caused by an arbovirus of the Flaviviridae family in the Fla-
vivirus genus. There are four viral serotypes of this virus,
designated DENV-1, DENV-2, DENV-3 and DENV-4. It is
transmitted by a mosquito vector called Stegomyia aegypti
(formerly  Aedes aegypti). Dengue is the predominant
arthropod borne viral disease affecting humans [3].
Around the world, 2.5 billion people in more than 100
countries are exposed to this virus annually. There are 50
to 100 million of cases per year, with 500,000 hospitaliza-
tions and 22,000 deaths annually worldwide [4]. The
World Health Organization has estimated that there has
been a 30-fold increase in the incidence of dengue in the
past 50 years [4]. There is no vaccine and no curative treat-
ment available. The only operational public health strat-
egy of defense is prevention through vector control [5].
Until 2006, the surveillance of dengue fever in French
Guiana was based on the weekly surveillance of biologi-
cally confirmed cases within the 200,000 general popula-
tion of French Guiana (table 1). The definition criteria
were: virus isolation on mosquito cells, viral RNA detec-
tion by reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR), or a serolog-
ical test based on immunoglobulin M (IgM)-capture
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (MAC-ELISA) [6].
The biological laboratories sent weekly results to the CVS
("Cellule de Veille Sanitaire") of French Guiana, working
in collaboration with CIRE ("Cellule Inter Regionale
d'Epidemiologie") of French Guiana and French West
Indies.
For the Armed Forces based in French Guiana, the surveil-
lance of dengue fever is based on the traditional clinical
military mandatory system SEA ("Surveillance Epidemi-
ologique dans les Armees"), functioning by the weekly
surveillance of 63 health events within the 3,000 soldiers
in French Guiana (table 1). Dengue fever is one of these
diseases. Its definition criteria are different, depending on
the epidemiological context. During an interepidemic
period, a dengue fever case is defined by a clinical picture
(fever, headache and at least 2 symptoms among retro-
orbital pains, myalgia, arthralgia, cutaneous rash, with or
without hemorrhagic symptoms) and a biological confir-
mation: virus isolation, viral RNA detection by reverse
transcription-PCR (RT-PCR), or a serological test based on
immunoglobulin M (IgM). During an epidemic period,
only the clinical picture is necessary. The cases are
recorded by the military general practitioners (GPs) and
weekly sent to the DIASS ("Direction Interarmées du Serv-
ice de santé") in Cayenne and to the IMTSSA ("Institut de
Médecine Tropicale du Service de santé des armées") in
Marseilles.
To enhance the performance of this clinical surveillance,
the solution was to create a new system: the 2SE FAG sys-
tem («Surveillance Spatiale des Epidémies au sein des
Forces Armées en Guyane»). This prototype was set up in
October 2004 [7,8], combined with the clinical system. Its
main objectives are to allow operational study of a real-
Table 1: General presentation of 2SE FAG (syndromic surveillance), SEA (clinical surveillance) and CVS (biological surveillance) 
systems.
2SE FAG SEA CVS
Date of first use 18/10/2004 01/01/1994 01/01/1995
Population coverage and 
main characteristics of the 
population
3 000 military people 11,8% 
women 88,2% men average age = 
34 years old
3 000 military people (id 2SE FAG) 
11,8% women 88,2% men average 
age = 34 years old
200 000 people (general population) 
50,5% women 49,5% men <15 years 
old: 35,4% >65 years old: 3,8%
Heath provision 15 general practitioners (GPs) 15 GPs (id 2SE FAG) 3 public hospitals 24 health centres 70 
GPs 7 biological laboratories (4 
private and 3 public)
Type of disease definition 
criteria
Syndromic 1. Clinical and biological (inter-
epidemic period)
Biological
2. Clinical (epidemic period) 3.
Timing of reports Real time Weekly Weekly
Statistical analysis * CPEG, EWMA CPEG Empirical method
Periodicity of feed-back Real time Weekly Monthly
* CPEG: Current Past Experienced Graph
EWMA: Exponentiel Weighted Moving AverageBMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/29
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time surveillance system using, to evaluate the value of
such a system compared to the traditional surveillance
and to identify interoperability criteria for allied coopera-
tion (countries of North-Atlantic Treaty Organization). It
is a real time surveillance system of fever within the 3,000
service men of French Guiana (table 1). A case of dengue
fever is defined as a sudden onset of fever (equal or more
than 38 degrees Celsius), with no evidence of other infec-
tion (particularly malaria, with rapid diagnostic test and/
or thick blood smear negative), associated with one or
more non specific symptoms including headache, myal-
gia, arthralgia and/or retro-orbital pains. These suspected
cases are recorded by military GPs and nurses (the same
people as for the clinical surveillance) and sent in real
time to the several servers set up in the epidemiological
unit of IPG ("Institut Pasteur de la Guyane") in Cayenne,
in the DIASS of Cayenne and in the IMTSSA in Marseilles.
During the first quarter of 2006 French Guiana suffered
the largest dengue outbreak in its history. The virus was
first detected in the west of the country and quickly spread
across the whole country. This outbreak was detected by
both military and civilian surveillance systems and spe-
cific public health responses were been implemented by
military and civilian health authorities.
The main objective of this survey was to study the value of
the syndromic surveillance system set up within the
armed forces for early warning, compared to the military
traditional clinical system during the 2005–2006 out-
break of dengue fever in French Guiana. The other objec-
tives were to highlight issues involved in comparing
military and civilian surveillance systems and to discuss
the interest of syndromic surveillance for public health
response.
Methods
Until 2006, the analysis of the civilian surveillance data
was performed by CVS in Cayenne, using an empiric
method, which had an alarm threshold of 6 cases per
week. If the number of cases exceeded this threshold for 2
consecutive weeks, further investigations were carried out.
For the analysis of military clinical surveillance data
(SEA), a weekly statistical non automated analysis is per-
formed by IMTSSA in Marseilles, using the Current Past
Experienced Graph [9] (CPEG). This method permits
comparison of the observed number of cases with histor-
ical data, generated from the past 3–5 years, using Student
and/or Poisson statistical laws. Those laws both give an
answer to the question "knowing the average number of
expected events during a period of time, what is the prob-
ability to observe the current situation?" The Poisson law
is usable for rare events (when it is not possible to use
binomial law) and Student law is derived from the normal
law.
The statistical analysis of military syndromic surveillance
data (2SE FAG) is automated and uses both the CPEG [9]
and the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
[10], which is a control chart method permitting to
smooth the curves of temporal data. These analyses are
performed within the 2SE FAG analysis network, called
CS3 ("communauté de services Internet pour la surveil-
lance syndromique"), and allows continuous definition
of the epidemiological situation.
To reach the first objective of comparing syndromic and
clinical military surveillance systems, two statistical meth-
ods were used to carry out the retrospective analysis of
data. The main studied performance was the early warn-
ing capacity. Therefore, the choice was to use practical and
robust statistical methods, well known to generate some
signals and to launch some alarms in routine use [11,12].
The first chosen method was the CPEG [9], commonly
used by both military systems and currently coded 0 if the
observed data weren't outside the historical limits ("nor-
mal" situation), + if the observed data were outside the
historical limits by more than 2 standard deviations ("pre-
alarm") and ++ if by more than 3 standard deviations
compared to the expected data ("alarm"). The second
method used was that of cumulated amounts (CUSUM)
[13,14], non routinely used by the systems in French
Guiana and used with a verification aim. This method,
commonly used for quality control in industry, has been
adapted to epidemiological surveillance, and works using
incidence and incidence rate. It is a control chart method,
a tool to determine whether a manufacturing or business
process is in a state of statistical control or not [15]. If the
chart indicates that the process being monitored is not in
control, the pattern it reveals can help determine the
source of variation to be eliminated to bring the process
back into control. In our study, if the curve goes up, there
is an increasing of incidence or incidence rate compared
to the reference (expected data for the same period); if it
lowers, there is a fall compared to the reference; if the
curve is parallel with the abscissa axis, then incidence or
incidence rate is stable.
To implement those methods and allow comparison
between systems, it was necessary to construct weekly data
for syndromic surveillance, which collects data in real
time, i.e. several times a day. Incidences and incidence
rates were then calculated. It was also necessary to have at
least 3 years of historical data for each system. This was the
case for clinical surveillance, but not for syndromic sur-
veillance, which was set up in October 2004 and effec-
tively operational in August 2005. Because of this, the
historical data base was constructed from the clinical sur-BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/29
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veillance data, including the whole health events having
fever in their clinical picture (8 health events).
Both statistical methods also permitted to realize a retro-
spective analysis of laboratory surveillance data. Military
and civilian authorities gave information about public
health response (time, nature, graduation).
The statistical analysis was carried out with EPI_db®, ver-
sion 1.0 (Société Sarvis, Kourou, French Guiana).
The study period was between week 41 of 2005 and week
25 of 2006. All the surveillance data were anonymous and
recorded in the same secure data base, after the agreement
of military and civilian public health authorities and the
approval of the French "commission nationale de l'infor-
matique et des libertés" (N°1149659) [see Additional file
1].
Results
At the beginning of the study period, in October 2005, the
epidemiological situation of dengue fever in French
Guiana was normal, after the end of a dengue fever out-
break (serotype DENV-3) which had occurred during the
previous months (from March to September 2005). Inci-
dence and incidence rates of dengue fever at this time were
considered to be normal. Figures 1 and 2 show weekly
incidence and incidence rates of the 3 systems, syndromic
and clinical surveillance reporting on the armed forces
and laboratory surveillance reporting on the civilian pop-
ulation. It was difficult to precisely evaluate the beginning
of the outbreak. Figure 1 shows the size of the outbreak
recorded by all systems. Figure 2 shows that the first
increases of incidence rate were detected by syndromic
surveillance. This figure indicates that the mechanisms of
spread were different within the military and civilian pop-
ulations. Biological analysis showed that the circulating
serotype during this outbreak was the DENV-2 serotype.
Weekly case counts of dengue fever (military clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected dengue fever cases (military syndro- mic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and weekly case counts of biologically confirmed cases  (civilian biological surveillance – CVS) within the general population in 2005 and 2006 (period of study between week 41 of  2005 and week 25 of 2006) Figure 1
Weekly case counts of dengue fever (military clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected dengue fever cases (military syndro-
mic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and weekly case counts of biologically confirmed cases 
(civilian biological surveillance – CVS) within the general population in 2005 and 2006 (period of study between week 41 of 
2005 and week 25 of 2006).
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Tables 2 and 3 show CPEG results for both syndromic and
clinical surveillance. Syndromic surveillance detected an
abnormal incidence of dengue fever in week 43, and again
during week 44, 3 to 4 weeks before the other systems.
During the outbreak, the results oscillated between nor-
mal and abnormal situations within the military popula-
tion with consistent gaps of several weeks between
syndromic and clinical surveillance. Among the general
population, the test showed an abnormal dengue fever
incidence for several months, as shown in figure 1.
This result was confirmed by the CUSUM analysis, which
gave results for incidences and incidence rates. The analy-
sis of the incidence rates curve (figure 3) showed a gap of
several weeks between the 3 systems, syndromic surveil-
lance was the first to detect an abnormal signal during
week 46. The timing of detection of an abnormal signal
was not totally synchronous between the two statistical
methods, but the gap between the 3 systems was shown
by both methods.
In terms of public health response, the sanitary military
authorities decided upon a reinforcement of collective
and individual measures of vector control, based on the
results provided by the automated analysis of syndromic
surveillance. A pre-alarm was activated during week 41,
this was not confirmed for three more weeks. The real
alarm with the armed forces started during week 44 of
2005. The epidemiological investigation involved various
steps commonly used to investigate syndromic surveil-
lance signals [16]: confirmation of the existence of the
outbreak, verification of the diagnosis, estimation of the
number of cases, orientation to person, place and time,
development and evaluation of a hypothesis, implemen-
tation of control measures and communication of find-
ings. Following the confirmation of the outbreak,
insecticides were used massively within the military
camps, both inside buildings and outdoors all over the
camps. All sites likely to harbor mosquito larvae were
destroyed or treated. Service personnel stopped wearing
short clothes and used repellents more often. Mosquito
nets were used when sleeping whether during the day or
night. Training for vector control was strengthened and
specific information distributed extensively.
On the civilian side, vector control actions which had
existed at the beginning of the dengue-2 outbreak were
essentially an extension of those that had been imple-
mented the previous summer due to the dengue-3 out-
break. The end of this outbreak had not been clearly
announced and the local vector control teams were still
active in the field. More time was necessary to detect the
new dengue fever outbreak, in particular because CVS did
not use any statistical tool to identify an increase in cases
above a threshold. Several weeks were also necessary for
the local vector borne disease committee to request a
Weekly incidence rates (number of cases per 1000 people) of dengue fever (clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected den- gue fever cases (syndromic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and weekly incidence rate of  biologically confirmed cases (laboratory surveillance – CVS) within the general population, from week 41 of 2005 to week 25  of 2006 Figure 2
Weekly incidence rates (number of cases per 1000 people) of dengue fever (clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected den-
gue fever cases (syndromic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and weekly incidence rate of 
biologically confirmed cases (laboratory surveillance – CVS) within the general population, from week 41 of 2005 to week 25 
of 2006.
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strengthening of existing vector control measures, with an
involvement of the local population and its elected mem-
bers. Specific training was set up within the communities
and communication and awareness campaigns were
organized among schools and among the general popula-
tion.
The outbreak ceased in July 2006. The final toll was 149
suspected cases and 15 biologically confirmed cases
among military personnel (attack rate = 5 cases per
1,000). On the civilian side, the final toll was 2,500 bio-
logically confirmed cases (attack rate = 13 cases per
1,000). The civilian cases included 204 hospitalized
patients with a confirmed dengue: 13% were dengue hem-
orrhagic fever cases, and 60% were scored as severe den-
gue cases without haemorrhage. Moreover, 4 deaths
associated with confirmed dengue were reported (3 chil-
dren and 1 adult).
Discussion
This survey has carried out its main objective, showing
that syndromic surveillance allowed an early detection of
Table 2: Results of CPEG tests realized for 2SE FAG (syndromic surveillance), SEA (clinical surveillance) and CVS (biological 
surveillance) systems, with Student and Poisson statistical laws, from observed incidences of the week 41 of 2005 to the week 25 of 
2006
Week 2SE FAG (Military-Syndromic) SEA (Military-Clinical) CVS (Civilian-Biological)
Student Poisson Student Poisson Student Poisson
W41/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0
W42/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0
W43/2005 0 + 00 0 0
W44/2005 ++ + 00 0 0
W45/2005 ++ ++ 00 0 0
W46/2005 ++ + + + + 0 +
W47/2005 0 0 ++ ++ 00
W48/2005 0 0 ++ ++ 00
W49/2005 0 + 00 ++ +
W50/2005 ++ + 00 ++ +
W51/2005 ++ + 00++ ++
W52/2005 + 00 0 ++ ++
W01/2006 0 0 ++ ++ ++ ++
W02/2006 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
W03/2006 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
W04/2006 ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
W05/2006 ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++
W06/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W07/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W08/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W09/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W10/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W11/2006 ++ + 00++ ++
W12/2006 0 + 00++ ++
W13/2006 + ++ ++ + ++ ++
W14/2006 + ++ ++ + ++ ++
W15/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W16/2006 0 0 + + ++ ++
W17/2006 0 0 + + ++ ++
W18/2006 0 0 + + ++ ++
W19/2006 0 0 ++ ++ ++ ++
W20/2006 0 0 ++ ++ ++ ++
W21/2006 0 0 ++ ++ ++ ++
W22/2006 0 0 ++ ++ ++ ++
W23/2006 0 0 + + ++ ++
W24/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W25/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
0: Weekly data included within historical limits
+: Weekly data beyond historical limits (more than 2 standard deviations)
++: Weekly data beyond historical limits (more than 3 standard deviations)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/29
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the dengue fever outbreak which had occurred in French
Guiana during the first quarter of 2006, before the refer-
ence and mandatory clinical military system. With all the
statistical methods used, syndromic surveillance detected
an abnormal situation several weeks before clinical sur-
veillance. There were no existing statistical methods to
determine if those dates were significantly different from
each other, contrary to simulated outbreaks [12]. This ear-
lier warning allowed a quicker public health response by
the armed forces. During the outbreak, several other
alarms occurred, with a lag of time between the systems,
showing that the outbreak was spreading to other military
units and that specific public health measures had to be
reinforced, especially vector control.
Other statistical methods could have been used to com-
pare performances of the systems, as proposed in different
studies [11,12]. The used methods were chosen to allow
study of the systems' early warning capacity, especially
timeliness. Some recent studies have underlined the inter-
est of CUSUM, which for example performed significantly
better than the methods of early aberration reporting sys-
Table 3: Results of CPEG tests realized for 2SE FAG (syndromic surveillance), SEA (clinical surveillance) and CVS (biological 
surveillance) systems, with Student and Poisson statistical laws, from observed incidence rates of the week 41 of 2005 to the week 25 
of 2006
Week 2SE FAG (Military-Syndromic) SEA (Military-Clinical) CVS (Civilian-Biological)
Student Poisson Student Poisson Student Poisson
W41/2005 0 + 00 0 0
W42/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0
W43/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0
W44/2005 ++ 00 0 0 0
W45/2005 + 00 0 0 0
W46/2005 + 0 + 00 0
W47/2005 0 0 ++ 00 +
W48/2005 0 0 ++ 00 0
W49/2005 0 0 0 0 ++ +
W50/2005 ++ 00 0 ++
W51/2005 ++ 00 0 ++ ++
W52/2005 + 00 ++ + 0
W01/2006 0 0 ++ + ++ ++
W02/2006 ++ ++ ++ 0 ++ ++
W03/2006 ++ 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W04/2006 ++ 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W05/2006 ++ 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W06/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W07/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W08/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W09/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W10/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W11/2006 ++ + 00++ ++
W12/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W13/2006 + + ++ ++ ++ ++
W14/2006 + 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W15/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W16/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W17/2006 0 0 0 ++ ++ +
W18/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W19/2006 0 0 ++ + ++ ++
W20/2006 0 0 ++ + ++ ++
W21/2006 0 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W22/2006 0 0 ++ 0 ++ ++
W23/2006 0 0 + 0 ++ ++
W24/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
W25/2006 0 0 0 0 ++ ++
0: Weekly data included within historical limits
+: Weekly data beyond historical limits (more than 2 standard deviations)
++: Weekly data beyond historical limits (more than 3 standard deviations)BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/8/29
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tem (EARS) across all the scenarios evaluated [17]. Other
methods have been used in a separate survey to evaluate
the other characteristics and parameters of both systems
[18].
The analysis of syndromic surveillance used historical
data prior to the creation of the system, using clinical
recorded events of fever, not just dengue fever. This has
certainly introduced a bias of classification into the study,
which was difficult to control.
The outbreak had an important impact upon the military
population, but the attack rate was far lower than within
the civilian population. It was not possible to determine
whether early warning and response resulted in avoidance
of any cases. It was therefore impossible to calculate the
number of avoided cases when using syndromic surveil-
lance and to quantify the real benefit compared to clinical
surveillance.
This study has also provided some elements of compari-
son between two different surveillance systems, civilian
and military. But it was extremely difficult, indeed even
impossible, to rigorously compare systems which don't
use the same diseases definition criteria for surveillance
within populations which were quite different in regard to
their exposures and access to medical care. Even if the out-
break has followed a different time course within the two
populations, those results have been presented anyhow,
because it seemed more interesting to present what was
known for those two intermingling populations than to
provide only military surveillance data, and because mili-
tary and civilian public health authorities worked very
closely. Statistical analysis showed that syndromic surveil-
lance was able to detect an abnormal signal before labora-
tory surveillance, as CVS didn't use any statistical tool at
this time. Also, laboratory surveillance was only based on
the surveillance of confirmed cases, in a French overseas
department where logistical problems represent a restric-
tive factor for the dispatch of biological samples to labo-
ratories. It was clear that cases reported by laboratory
surveillance were not totally representative of the real sit-
uation of dengue fever within the general population. It is
one of the reasons why the health authorities decided dur-
ing the outbreak, in April 2006, to reinforce the laboratory
surveillance system by introducing syndromic surveil-
lance. These two types of surveillance are complementary;
both contribute different surveillance data and together
allow a better assessment of the epidemiological situation
and therefore a better public health response. This new
CUSUM for weekly incidence rates of dengue fever (military clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected dengue fever cases  (military syndromic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and CUSUM of weekly incidence rate of  biologically confirmed cases (civilian biological surveillance – CVS) within the general population, from week 41 of 2005 to  week 25 of 2006 Figure 3
CUSUM for weekly incidence rates of dengue fever (military clinical surveillance – SEA) and of suspected dengue fever cases 
(military syndromic surveillance – 2SE FAG) within the armed forces in French Guiana, and CUSUM of weekly incidence rate of 
biologically confirmed cases (civilian biological surveillance – CVS) within the general population, from week 41 of 2005 to 
week 25 of 2006.
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civilian system took into account the experience of other
systems' [19], which have underlined the importance of
surveillance system quality, the integration of syndromic
surveillance with public health response and the impor-
tance of guidelines for informaticians, public health man-
agers and general practitioners potentially involved. The
addition of syndromic surveillance required the involve-
ment of numerous new contributors in French Guiana (a
network of GPs, health centres, hospital emergency units,
hospital wards and the armed forces) and a new coordina-
tion team. It allowed an estimation of the impact of the
2006 outbreak, recording 16,200 suspected cases whereas
the previous system counted only 2,500 confirmed cases.
On both military and civilian sides, that experience shows
that a strategy based only on biological results gives
incomplete data and the addition of a syndromic surveil-
lance system gives more information. However, syndro-
mic surveillance is associated with an increased risk of
false alarms and of system saturation in case of outbreak.
The use of syndromic surveillance has been validated pre-
viously, for example the exploitation of respiratory data
[20]. However, some studies suggest that syndromic sur-
veillance systems are unlikely to provide early detection of
outbreaks [21]. The contribution of syndromic surveil-
lance as a tool for local outbreak detection remains a sub-
ject open to debate. The strengths of syndromic systems
have been reviewed in a study of the current literature and
presentation of the views of experts [22]. Syndromic sur-
veillance is currently used for the surveillance of dengue
fever within several countries of South America, like in
Paraguay. However, for the control of a dengue fever out-
break, biological analyses remain essential for identifying
the dengue virus circulating and its serotype, so the appro-
priate diagnostic capacity must be maintained. It is why
biological analysis is the main point of several dengue
fever surveillance systems, as in French West Indies [23].
The complementary nature of the two systems was high-
lighted in French Guiana and has been described by other
authors [24], underlining the interest to reinforce timeli-
ness and sensitivity of the system by the introduction of
syndromic surveillance. The pertinence of timeliness in
public health surveillance systems was also underlined by
some authors [25], [26]. The value of syndromic surveil-
lance allowed the military authorities to quickly respond
to an outbreak and the civilian authorities to better evalu-
ate the public health situation. This led to negotiations
with the national authorities and the French Ministry of
Health resulting in improved public health funding to the
area.
Conclusion
The syndromic surveillance allowed an early warning for
this outbreak to be issued and a quicker public health
response by the armed forces. However, the direct benefit
could not be evaluated. The civilian surveillance system
has since introduced syndromic surveillance as part of its
surveillance strategy. This should enable quicker public
health responses in the future.
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